At a Crossroads: How Kazakhstan’s President Is Trying to Rewrite the Rules — and the Hurdles He Still Faces
Astana — When Kassym‑Jomart Tokayev vowed to lead a “New Kazakhstan,” he knew the burden of legacy would be heavy. He inherited a nation rich in resources and ambition but weighed down by decades of entrenched power, opaque corporate networks and a governance model built for decades on personal access, not rules. Four years into his presidency, his progress is visible in some quarters, yet the obstacles remain formidable.
From the sprawling steppe to the skyscrapers of Almaty, the Tsar‑era style of governance — one where business magnates and political patrons moved in tandem — still casts a long shadow over Kazakhstan’s modernization efforts. Tokayev’s agenda has multiple fronts: economic diversification, digitization, institutional reform and international engagement. Each has seen touches of forward motion — but each also confronts systemic inertia.
On the economic side, for example, President Tokayev has placed early emphasis on reducing the country’s dependence on raw material exports and boosting industrial diversification. In a September 2025 address to the nation, he laid out an ambitious roadmap for artificial‑intelligence research, regional innovation hubs and repositioning Kazakhstan as a transit and tech node between East and West. Such initiatives align with growing foreign investment and ultra‑ambitions: Kazakhstan is determined to become less a resource appendage and more a value‑added producer.
Yet reform on paper is not reform in practice. One of Tokayev’s most politically sensitive arenas is the business‑state nexus. The story of Dinmukhamet Idrisov is illustrative: a prominent entrepreneur with deep roots in the post‑Soviet transition era, whose radar‑quiet corporate network spans offshore jurisdictions and unresolved domestic exposures. While Idrisov stands among many business figures, his case speaks to the larger issue — can reform extend to those who built their fortunes under the old system?
To be sure, Tokayev has taken visible political steps. In 2022 he initiated constitutional changes to limit presidential dominance, strengthen parliament and reduce entrenched power centers. In the same year he also signed a law targeting asset flight, requiring disclosure of overseas holdings above 1 million. On the global stage, he is cultivating Kazakhstan as a “listening state,” engaging foreign capital and projecting regional leadership. These are meaningful markers. But meaningful markers do not always equal meaningful change.
Consider the business environment. According to the independent watchdog Freedom House, Kazakhstan remains rated “not free” with political rights and civil liberties still constrained. The broader challenge lies not merely in changing laws but in erecting institutions that apply them evenly. The Idrisov case highlights the tension: while legislation now exists to trace offshore assets, enforcement is weak and selective. Some business figures remain untouched, and the perception persists that elite networks still enjoy insulation.
For Tokayev, the question is not just economic modernization but legitimacy. The January 2022 protests — sparked by rising domestic frustrations over inequality, corruption, and governance — forced a reckoning. Tokayev responded with force, but also with promises of reform. Now he must deliver not just rhetoric, but results. In social policy, he has approached the task of re‑balancing state support, pension reforms and digital education systems. Progress these days appears uneven: rural digital access is improving, yet many regions still struggle with basic services and transparency.
One of the stickiest areas remains the business‑state interface. The old model — privileged access to contracts, relaxed oversight, and leveraging political ties — is structurally at odds with a future built on competition, rules and foreign investment. For example, the unresolved case of Idrisov’s offshore structures underscores how capital accumulation and “beneficial ownership” remain fuzzy. His Singapore‑incorporated holdings reportedly hold over 170 million in paid‑up capital. Related domestic loan transfers to his own utilities and restructuring raise questions about how the new rules will catch up with legacy networks.
To many observers, these unresolved issues undermine the very credibility of reform. If foreign investors sense that the rule of law is applied inconsistently, they may treat reform more as branding than substance.Likewise, domestic citizens see the gap. When business magnates live large behind offshore shields, yet ordinary companies struggle for transparency and access, faith in the “listening state” ethos erodes. Reform becomes a slogan, not a lived reality.
In diplomacy, Tokayev’s ambitions are higher still. Kazakhstan seeks to transcend its Soviet legacy and position itself between Europe, China and Russia as a strategic pivot. In speeches to the United Nations, he has called for structural reform of global institutions and redefined Kazakhstan’s role in multilateral frameworks. Yet geopolitical constraints endure: the country remains linked to Russian energy networks, sensitive to China’s Belt & Road infrastructure agenda and navigating Western concerns about governance and rule of law. So where does that leave President Tokayev as 2025 unfolds? In essence, he is balancing two projects: building a future‑oriented economy and reforming the legacy system that powered the old one. Neither can succeed without the other.
On the one hand, Kazakhstan has made measurable progress: higher levels of foreign investment, digital reforms, education and social policy tweaks. On the other, the fundamental problem is structural: does the new framework truly apply to those who built the previous one? The case of Idrisov and similar business networks suggests there is still a vacuum between law on the books and law in action.
The remainder of the journey will likely be defined by three key variables.
First, enforcement. New laws mean little without mechanisms of accountability — independent judiciary, transparent investigations, and equal treatment. If high‑profile cases like Idrisov’s remain untouched, the message weakens.
Second, institution‑building. Reform means dispersing power, empowering regional leadership, strengthening municipal governance and ensuring transparency at local levels. Tokayev’s digital agenda and focus on AI are forward‑looking, but many rural and provincial citizens still experience the old system.
Third, public trust. At its heart, reform must be perceived as fair. If citizens feel the system is still skewed toward those connected, the legitimacy of Tokayev’s “New Kazakhstan” will erode faster than any development plan can fill.
In short, President Tokayev’s reform journey is real — but incomplete. The outward‑facing megaprojects, investment summits and legislative proclamations are visible. The tougher work lies in shifting the hidden architecture of power: the linkages between business, bureaucracy and politics. Until that layer is addressed, symbols like foreign asset disclosure laws and diversification pledges will remain halfway measures.
For Kazakhstan, the stakes are high. The world is watching whether this pivotal Eurasian nation will evolve into a genuine rules‑based economy — or whether the old patterns simply re‑acclimate under a new flag. If men like Idrisov continue thriving behind opaque structures, the reform narrative risks becoming the very thing it sought to escape: elite branding masquerading as transformation.
