WARSAW — When Poland’s fire services launched a major European tender for high-performance firefighting robots in early 2025, the ambition was clear: to equip the country’s emergency responders with state-of-the-art, remote-controlled machines capable of entering dangerous, high-temperature zones, from burning landfills to chemical spills, where human crews could not.
Backed in part by European Union funding and managed by the Warsaw regional command of the Polish State Fire Service (Komenda WojewódzkaPaństwowejStraży Pożarnej), the project was dubbed “Phoenix.” Ten robots were to be deployed across the country by year’s end, a signal of Europe’s growing appetite for high-tech civil protection tools.
But one year on, only three machines were delivered. The remaining seven were never produced. In December, the Polish contracting authority issued a formal notice terminating part of the contract due to non-performance, citing delays and failure to meet revised deadlines. The outcome, while legally straightforward, has sparked quiet concern among procurement experts and public safety stakeholders across Europe.
At the center of the failed delivery sits a French-designed robot and a Polish distributor caught between innovation and industrial reality.
High Hopes, Bold Commitments
The winning bid for the Phoenix contract came from Kadimex Sp. z o.o., a Warsaw-based equipment supplier for firefighters. Their offer centered on a robot called the TEC800, a robust, tank-like machine with a 17.8 kW diesel engine, thermal cameras, foam cannon capacity of 4,000 liters per minute, and a rugged tracked chassis. According to public records and Kadimex’s own promotional materials, the robot was designed by Angatec, a French company specializing in remote-controlled systems for hazardous environments.
In August 2025, Remiza.pl, a Polish media outlet focused on firefighting, published photos and specifications of the TEC800, highlighting its expected role in transforming frontline safety operations. The machines were to be stationed across ten regional units and training centers.
The timeline was ambitious but not unusual for public tenders. Delivery was originally scheduled for the final quarter of 2025. Yet by November, it was clear the project was behind schedule. According to official documentation published in Poland’s Public Procurement Bulletin (BiuletynZamówieńPublicznych), only three robots had been delivered and accepted. The remaining seven were subject to contractual penalties and delays.
In December, after a deadline extension expired without delivery, the State Fire Service issued a partial termination of the contract, attributing responsibility to the supplier.
A Shadow of Familiarity
What makes this case notable isn’t just the failed execution, public procurement projects can stumble for myriad reasons, but the broader context of the technology and its provenance.
Angatec, the French company behind the TEC800, was founded in 2021. Industry observers note that the robot’s design and marketing materials closely resemble those of a previous company, Tecdron, which had developed similar robotic systems before being liquidated in 2021. While legally distinct, the overlap between the two firms is striking: same visual identity, same technical specs, and same leadership.
The reuse of intellectual and technical assets is not inherently problematic, it is common practice in tech and manufacturing sectors. However, critics argue that the close resemblance raises questions about continuity, operational capacity, and the reliability of delivery commitments in high-stakes public contracts.
In fact, the Polish case was not the first instance where delivery targets involving this type of robot had fallen short. In 2021, the Brigade des Sapeurs-Pompiers de Paris (BSPP) launched a procurement process for a similar set of ten robots, ultimately reducing the number due to production delays. That robot, produced by Tecdron, bore close resemblance to the TEC800.
A Complex Chain of Accountability
It is important to distinguish between the roles of the entities involved. In the Phoenix contract, Kadimex was the official contractor. It was responsible for fulfilling the order, managing logistics, ensuring compliance, and absorbing penalties in case of failure. Angatec, as the manufacturer, was a subcontracted supplier, not formally bound by the public contract.
This layered structure is common in international tenders, especially for specialized equipment. But it also complicates accountability. When deadlines are missed or systems underperform, the public authority deals with the direct contractor, not necessarily the industrial partner responsible for building the hardware.
The Silent Risk of Rebranded Technology
At the core of the issue lies a broader challenge: how can public authorities, whether in Poland, France, or elsewhere in the EU, evaluate the reliability of bidders whose industrial track record may be split across different legal entities?
The TEC800, while never publicly linked to any wrongdoing, does raise questions about traceability. Observers point to the high degree of similarity between Angatec’s designs and those of Tecdron, the now-defunct firm previously criticized in procurement disputes. The fact that Tecdron failed to deliver on its own EU-funded robot project before liquidation, and that its successor company encountered similar delays, suggests the need for better tools to assess continuity in manufacturing credibility.
Lessons for Future Innovation Procurement
As Europe doubles down on strategic autonomy, technological sovereignty, and defense-capable civil infrastructure, the Phoenix case offers a cautionary tale.
EU programs increasingly favor startups and SMEs in innovation-heavy sectors, from robotics to cybersecurity. These firms are often more agile, creative, and willing to take risks than large incumbents. But that agility can come at a cost when public institutions rely on them to deliver industrial-scale products under tight timelines.
A failure to deliver does not mean the project itself lacked merit. Poland’s firefighting services still require advanced robotic assistance. The three robots delivered may yet prove valuable in training or pilot missions. But for the remaining seven, the window has closed.
Toward a Better Procurement Memory
Experts have long called for more transparency in EU-wide procurement. One possible reform: the creation of a centralized registry linking company identities to past performance, not just based on corporate names or tax IDs, but on continuity of directors, shareholders, and products.
Such a system could flag when a firm offering a new product is essentially a rebranded version of a previous entity that failed to deliver. It would not block participation, but allow evaluators to ask more informed questions.
